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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 In civil, agency, bankruptcy, and mandamus cases, a disclosure statement must be filed by all
parties, with the following exceptions: (1) the United States is not required to file a disclosure 
statement; (2) an indigent party is not required to file a disclosure statement; and (3) a state 
or local government is not required to file a disclosure statement in pro se cases. (All parties 
to the action in the district court are considered parties to a mandamus case.)   
 In criminal and post-conviction cases, a corporate defendant must file a disclosure statement. 
 In criminal cases, the United States must file a disclosure statement if there was an 
organizational victim of the alleged criminal activity. (See question 7.) 
 Any corporate amicus curiae must file a disclosure statement. 
 Counsel has a continuing duty to update the disclosure statement.   
No.  __________ Caption:  __________________________________________________
Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1, 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(name of party/amicus) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 who is _______________________, makes the following disclosure: 
(appellant/appellee/petitioner/respondent/amicus/intervenor)  
1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO 
2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations? YES NO 
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including all generations of parent corporations: 
3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or 
other publicly held entity? YES NO 
If yes, identify all such owners: 
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4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct 
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If yes, identify entity and nature of interest: 
5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)   YES   NO 
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected 
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is 
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member: 
6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?    YES NO 
If yes, the debtor, the trustee, or the appellant (if neither the debtor nor the trustee is a 
party) must list (1) the members of any creditors’ committee, (2) each debtor (if not in the 
caption), and (3) if a debtor is a corporation, the parent corporation and any publicly held 
corporation that owns 10% or more of the stock of the debtor.   
7. Is this a criminal case in which there was an organizational victim?  YES NO 
If yes, the United States, absent good cause shown, must list (1) each organizational 
victim of the criminal activity and (2) if an organizational victim is a corporation, the 
parent corporation and any publicly held corporation that owns 10% or more of the stock 
of victim, to the extent that information can be obtained through due diligence. 
Signature: ____________________________________  Date: ___________________ 
Counsel for: __________________________________ 
/s/ Andrew Tutt 06/02/2020
Jeffrey D. Kahn
ii 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 3 of 44
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
RULE 26.1 STATEMENT .................................................................................... i 
TABLE  OF AUTHORITIES ..............................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO 
FILE OF AMICUS CURIAE ..................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 1
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 2
I. The Terrorist Screening Database .............................................................. 2
A. The TSDB, by Origin and Design, Has No Statutory or 
Regulatory Foundation but Nevertheless Affects the Lives 
and Livelihoods of Millions of Americans ........................................ 3
B. Appellants’ Assurance of Rigorous Procedures and 
Standards Are Pie-Crust Promises: Easily Made and 
Easily Broken .................................................................................... 12
II. The Terrorist Screening Center ................................................................ 21
A. The TSC Insulates Itself from Ordinary Sources of 
Oversight and Accountability, Creating an Institutional 
Culture in Need of Judicial Review ................................................ 22
B. Legal Precedents That Accord Discretion to Predict 
Future Conduct Rely on Transparency and Neutrality 
That the TSC Eschews in Favor of Unconstitutionally 
Vague Standards Riddled with Exceptions ................................... 28
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 33
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................ 34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 35
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 4 of 44
iv 
TABLE  OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page(s) 
Elhady v. Kable, 
391 F.Supp.3d 562 (E.D. Va. 2019) ................................................................... 7 
Gilmore v. Gonzales, 
435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) ............................................................................. 4 
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
62 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................... 18, 19, 20 
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
912 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................... 20 
Johnson v. United States, 
--- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) .................................................................... 29 
Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123 (1951) ............................................................................................ 21 
Jurek v. Texas, 
428 U.S. 262 (1976) ............................................................................................ 29 
Kashem v. Barr, 
941 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2019) ................................................................. 29, 30, 31 
Mohamed v. Holder, 
995 F.Supp.2d 520 (E.D. Va. 2014) ................................................................. 15 
Schall v. Martin, 
467 U.S. 253 (1984) ............................................................................................ 29 
SEC v. Chenery, 
332 U.S. 194 (1947) ............................................................................................ 32 
Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................................................................................................ 14 
U.S. v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285 (2008) ...................................................................................... 30, 31 




§ 552a(e)(5) ........................................................................................................ 22 
6 U.S.C. 
§ 485(b)(1)(A) ....................................................................................................... 6 
§ 485(b)(2)(H) ...................................................................................................... 6 
§ 485(f)(2)(B)(viii) ................................................................................................ 6 
§ 488a(i) ................................................................................................................ 7 
§ 622(d)(2) ............................................................................................................ 8 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 2331(1) ............................................................................................................. 31 
§ 2331(5) ............................................................................................................. 31 
42 U.S.C. 
§ 300mm-21(a)(4)................................................................................................. 8 
§ 300mm-21(a)(5)................................................................................................. 8 
49 U.S.C. 
§ 114(h)(3)(B) ....................................................................................................... 5 
Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 4, 75 Stat. 466, 467-68 ...................... 3 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 1016, 
codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485 ................................................................................... 5 
Rules & Regulations 
6 C.F.R. 
Pt. 5, App. C....................................................................................................... 22 
8 C.F.R. 
§ 235.7a(c)(2)(vii) ................................................................................................. 9 
§ 235.12(b)(2)(vi) .................................................................................................. 9 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 6 of 44
vi 
28 C.F.R. 
§16.96(s)(4) ......................................................................................................... 22 
§16.96(s)(6) ......................................................................................................... 22 
§16.96(s)(7) ......................................................................................................... 22 
§16.96(s)(7) ......................................................................................................... 22 
32 C.F.R. 
§ 156.6(e)(3)(ii) ..................................................................................................... 8 
§ 157.6(a)(4)(i)(B) ................................................................................................ 8 
§ 161.7(c)(3)(ii) ..................................................................................................... 8 
49 C.F.R. 
§ 1572.5(a)(3) ....................................................................................................... 8 
§ 1572.5(b) ............................................................................................................ 8 
§ 1572.7(a)(2) ....................................................................................................... 8 
80 Fed. Reg. 79058 (Dec. 18, 2015) ........................................................................ 8 
83 Fed. Reg. 32674 (July 13, 2018) ......................................................................... 9 
Fed. R. App. Proc. 29(4)(E)(i) ................................................................................ 1 
Fed. R. App. Proc. 29(4)(E)(iii) .............................................................................. 1 
Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 5681 (Feb. 6, 2012) ........................................................ 9 
Final Rule, World Trade Center Health Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 
90926 (Dec. 15, 2016) .......................................................................................... 9 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 59932 (Nov. 19, 
2009) ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Other Authorities 
9/11 Commission Report 83 (2004) .................................................................. 4, 11 
Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 Wisc. 
L. Rev. 1203 (2010) ........................................................................................... 11 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 7 of 44
vii 
Bob Orr, Inside a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS 
Evening News (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:03 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-a-secret-us-terrorist-
screening-center/ .............................................................................................. 26 
Exclusive Interview with Terrorist Screening Center Director 
Christopher Piehota, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/04/06/exclusive-
interview-with-terrorist-screening-center-director-
christopher-piehota-origwx-allee.cnn................................................. 23, 25, 26 
FBI TSC video, https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/160906-
terrorist-screening-center-sept11-memorial.mp4/view ............................... 28 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (Sept. 16, 2003) ............................ 6 
Jeffrey Kahn, Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel and 
Terrorist Watchlists 133-34 (2013) ......................................................... 3, 4, 14 
Jeffrey Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, in The Cambridge 
Handbook of Surveillance Law 88 (2017) .................................................. 6, 11 
Jeffrey Kahn, The Unreasonable Rise of Reasonable Suspicion: 
Terrorist Watchlists and Terry v. Ohio, 26 Wm. & Mary Bill 
Rts J. 383 (2017) ................................................................................................ 14 
Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret 
Government Rulebook for Labeling You a Terrorist, The 
Intercept, July 23, 2014, 
https://theintercept.com/2014/07/23/blacklisted/........................................... 13 
Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel and Terrorist 
Watchlists (University of Michigan Press, 2013; paperback 
2014) ..................................................................................................................... 1 
Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism 78-79, 86-87 (1990) ............................................................................ 3 
Tom Jackman, Vienna Tormented by FBI Building’s Non-Stop 
Buzz, Wash. Post (June 21, 2012) ................................................................... 23 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 8 of 44
viii 
Transportation Security Administration, Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC®) Information for the 
Military to Mariner Initiative 2-3 (April 24, 2015), 
https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/TWIC.pdf ................................................... 9 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center 7 (2007) ................. 6, 13 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of the Terrorist Screening Center 42 (2005) .............................. 12, 13 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 9 of 44
1 
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST AND AUTHORITY TO FILE 
OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Jeffrey D. Kahn has been studying terrorist watchlists and the Terrorist 
Screening Center since 2006.1  He is the author of Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The 
Right to Travel and Terrorist Watchlists (University of Michigan Press, 2013; 
paperback 2014) among other works.  In 2013, he testified as an expert witness 
for the plaintiff in Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 06-0545-
WHA (N.D. Cal. 2013).  He files this brief in support of appellees to clarify 
appellants’ depictions of the Terrorist Screening Database and Terrorist 
Screening Center.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants present an incomplete and misleading array of assurances 
about the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) and the Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC) that compiles it.  Appellants depict a standards-based, process-
oriented, intra-governmental information sharing system with multiple levels 
of quality control.  The reality is starkly different.  Like all self-praise, these 
1 Pursuant to Rule 29(4)(E)(i)-(iii) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, Amicus states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or 
in part and that no person other than Amicus and his counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission.  Appellees granted their blanket 
consent to the filing of amici curiae briefs on May 18, 2020.  Appellants con-
sented to the filing of this brief on May 19, 2020. 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 10 of 44
2 
descriptions are based on self-determined standards riddled with exceptions.  
As a result, legal precedents that appellants deploy are at best non sequiturs, 
since they are predicated on normal administrative procedures and expecta-
tions of transparency and neutrality absent from the operation of this irregu-
lar entity and its uniquely injurious work product. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Terrorist Screening Database 
Appellants depict the TSDB as a small2 and innocuous,3 yet carefully 
built4 and rigorously standards-based5 system of intra-governmental records.6
None of these claims is wholly true or, in some cases, true at all.  In fact, the 
TSDB is an enormous and powerful system that emerged in the chaotic tumult 
2 “Less than 0.5% of all the persons on the TSDB are U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents, or approximately 4,600 individuals.” Appellants’ Br. at 
2. 
3 “The TSDB neither contains any classified information nor includes the de-
rogatory information upon which a person’s status may be based.” Id. at 4. 
4 “Before an individual is added to the TSDB, the nomination undergoes a care-
ful multi-step review process by the federal agency nominating the individual; 
the NCTC or FBI; and TSC.” Id. at 2-3. 
5 “The nomination must rely upon articulable intelligence or information 
which, … creates a reasonable suspicion … .”  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
6 “TSC exports various subsets of the TSDB to different federal agencies, 
which use that information for various screening and other security functions.”  
Id. at 4; “The Government does not publicly disclose plaintiffs’ TSDB status 
… .”  Id. at 19. 
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following the attacks of September 11, 2001.  No statute created it and no pub-
lished regulations bind its users to follow their own rules.  Its self-imposed 
constraints, secretly issued merely as “guidance,” are a Swiss cheese confec-
tion of exceedingly low standards riddled with multiple exceptions to their ap-
plication.     
A. The TSDB, by Origin and Design, Has No Statutory or 
Regulatory Foundation but Nevertheless Affects the Lives 
and Livelihoods of Millions of Americans  
Nature abhors a vacuum and the nature of government watchlists is one 
of continuous expansion.  In the beginning, there was no TSDB.  Immediately 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Govern-
ment seized on decades-old authority granted the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) to issue “Security Directives” that warned airlines not to carry 
persons believed to present a “specific and credible threat” to civil aviation 
security.  Report of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism 78-79, 86-87 (1990); Jeffrey Kahn, Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right 
to Travel and Terrorist Watchlists 133-34 (2013).  This power was grounded 
in statute.  Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 4, 75 Stat. 466, 467-68.  
Understandably, FBI agents began to use Security Directives the day 
after the September 11 attacks to rapidly expand the dozen or so names such 
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directives identified on that awful day as presenting a “specific and credible 
threat” to aviation security.  9/11 Commission Report 83 (2004).  According to 
a high-level internal TSA memorandum: 
[Early on September 12, 2001, A]t the request of the FBI, the FAA 
issued SD-108-01-06/EA 129-01-05, which included a list of individ-
uals developed by the FBI as part of the Pentbom investigation. 
… The FBI “controlled,” both administratively and operationally, 
the contents of the list and added or removed names in accordance 
with the Pentbom investigation.  The FAA received the list from 
the FBI and disseminated it to air carriers, without any format or 
content changes.  FAA, in essence, acted as a conduit for the dis-
semination of their “watchlist.”7
Kahn (2013), at 140 (quoting TSA Memorandum on “TSA Watchlists” dated 
Oct. 16, 2002, from Claudio Manno, Acting Associate Under Secretary for 
Transportation Security Intelligence to Associate Under Secretary for Secu-
rity Regulation and Policy).   
With the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (to 
which the FAA’s responsibility for aviation security was transferred by statute 
in November 2001), the TSA Under Secretary was authorized “to issue Secu-
rity Directives without providing notice or an opportunity for comment in or-
der to protect transportation security.”  Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 
7 Pentbom was the code name for the FBI’s investigation into the 9/11 attacks. 
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1131 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006).  A newly named “No Fly List” was built on those se-
curity directives but expanded from specific threats to civil aviation security 
to include individuals “who may be a threat to civil aviation or national secu-
rity.”  49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(B).  The disjunctive grew TSA’s Security Di-
rective-issued lists to include individuals who present no threat to civil aviation 
at all. 
But where do the names on these lists come from?  They are subsets of 
the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) housed at the FBI’s Terrorist 
Screening Center.  The TSDB is not issued as a Security Directive or under 
any other legal authority possessed by the TSA.  Indeed, no statutes or pub-
lished regulations created it, and none regulate its use.8  It is entirely a product 
8 In the district court, Deputy Director for Operations Timothy P. Groh 
averred that Congress “mandated greater sharing of terrorist information 
among federal departments and agencies, while still protecting privacy and 
civil liberties,” citing § 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act, codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485.  Groh Declaration at ¶ 4, Docket # 299-4.  
That section does not reference the TSDB or TSC, let alone establish limits on 
them.  Other than requiring, in 2005, some reports and guidelines that lack any 
indication of obligation, it provides only  hortatory instructions to the Director 
of National Intelligence to “create an information sharing environment … con-
sistent with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties” 
and, “to the greatest extent practicable, ensure that the ISE provides the func-
tional equivalent of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized, distributed and 
coordinated environment that … incorporates protections for individuals’ pri-
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of a 2003 presidential directive and associated memoranda of understanding 
that by their own terms neither provide new legal authority for action by the 
federal government nor any right enforceable against it.  See Homeland Se-
curity Presidential Directive-6 (Sept. 16, 2003).9
Although its origin is not mandated by any statute, the TSDB neverthe-
less exists and it is not small.  By February 2006, the number of records in it 
had risen to 400,000.  Jeffrey Kahn, Terrorist Watchlists, in The Cambridge 
Handbook of Surveillance Law 88 (2017) (citing U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of the Inspector General, Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening 
vacy and civil liberties,” 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(1)(A) & (2)(H); and directs the pro-
gram manager responsible for federal government information sharing to “en-
sure the protection of privacy and civil liberties” when he or she assists “in the 
development of policies, as appropriate, to foster the development and proper 
operation” of the information sharing environment.  6 U.S.C. § 
485(f)(2)(B)(viii). 
9 “This directive does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of de-
partment and agency heads to carry out operational activities or provide or 
receive information.  This directive is intended only to improve the internal 
management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not, cre-
ate any right or benefit enforceable at law or in equity by any party against 
the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees or 
agents, or any other person.” 
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Center 7 (2007)).  The TSDB currently contains records concerning approxi-
mately 1.2 million individuals.  Elhady v. Kable, 391 F.Supp.3d 562, 568 (E.D. 
Va. 2019).10
Though originally created ostensibly with a narrower purpose in mind, 
the existence of such a massive and growing database led to laws and regula-
tions that expand its compass without establishing any standards or criteria 
subject to traditional rulemaking procedures (or even authorizing their ex-
emption from notice-and-comment rulemaking, as was the case with Security 
Directives newly issued by the TSA).  In addition to those entities already de-
scribed by appellees in the district court,11 the TSDB may be checked to reg-
ulate owners and purchasers of a common fertilizer;12 vet personnel at select 
10 Appellants do not dispute this statistic.  See Defendant’s Statement Identi-
fying Facts Recited in the Court’s September 4, 2019 Order That Are Dis-
puted, Elhady v. Kable, 1:16-cv-00375, Docket # 338 (Dec. 16, 2019). 
11 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Elhady v. Kable, 1:16-cv-00375, Docket # 304 (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2019) 
at ¶¶ 90-94; 97-110; and 117-21. 
12 For example, ammonium nitrate facilities and purchasers of ammonium ni-
trate (a common fertilizer but also an ingredient in bombs) are subject to reg-
istration requirements that include a check and periodic recheck against the 
Terrorist Screening Database (which may result in denial or revocation of reg-
istration).  See 6 U.S.C. § 488a(i).   
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chemical facilities;13 issue permits to maritime workers;14 license commercial 
drivers;15 and credential foreign nationals working in certain government sec-
tors.16  Even eligibility for health services established for both first responders 
to the World Trade Center on September 11 and certain survivors of those 
terrorist attacks may be subject to a TSDB check.17  These uses envelop mil-
13 The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program requires covered 
facilities to undertake vetting of personnel through the Terrorist Screening 
Database.  See 6 U.S.C. § 622(d)(2).  This may be done directly or via existing 
programs that already vet through the TSDB.  See 80 Fed. Reg. 79058 (Dec. 
18, 2015).   
14 Those seeking to obtain or renew a federal-issued Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) for access to secure maritime facilities and 
vessels are subject to security threat assessments based on a search of terror-
ist watchlists and related databases, 49 C.F.R. § 1572.7(a)(2), which may result 
in denial or immediate revocation of these essential credentials for commercial 
shipping, 49 C.F.R. § 1572.5(a)(3) & (b). 
15 Those seeking to obtain or renew a state-issued Hazardous Materials En-
dorsement (HME) are subject to the same security threat assessments de-
scribed supra note 14. 
16 For example, foreign nationals applying for a Common Access Card (CAC) 
at the Department of Defense are subject to a name check against the TSDB.  
See 32 C.F.R. § 156.6(e)(3)(ii), 32 C.F.R. § 157.6(a)(4)(i)(B), and 32 C.F.R. § 
161.7(c)(3)(ii).   
17 42 U.S.C. § 300mm-21(a)(5) (“No individual who is on the terrorist watch list 
maintained by the Department of Homeland Security shall qualify as an eligi-
ble WTC responder.  Before enrolling any individual as a WTC responder in 
the WTC Program under paragraph (3), the Administrator, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall determine whether the indi-
vidual is on such list.”); 42 U.S.C. § 300mm-21(a)(4) (substantially the same 
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lions of Americans in TSDB-linked assessments on which their jobs and liveli-
hoods, not to mention their free movement, depend.18  There may be other 
programs in which the TSDB is actively consulted, but hidden from view, such 
as in the popular Global Entry Trusted Traveler Program used annually by 
over 1.4 million people.19
Expansion of the TSDB was entirely predictable.  In fact, this heady 
ambition was memorialized in a 2009 PowerPoint slide shared by Timothy 
language for eligible WTC survivors); Final Rule, World Trade Center Health 
Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 90926, 90928 (Dec. 15, 2016) (identifying TSC as the 
entity that conducts the screening). 
18 In 2015, there were two million currently active TWIC cards and 3.3 million 
enrollments from longshoremen, truckers, railroad employees, maintenance 
personnel, mariners, and others.  Transportation Security Administration, 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC®) Information for 
the Military to Mariner Initiative 2-3 (April 24, 2015), available at
https://www.cmts.gov/downloads/TWIC.pdf.   
19 The popular Global Entry program run by U.S. Customs and Border Pro-
tection is a good example.  The proposed rule for this program included as a 
disqualifying factor: “The applicant has been identified on a Government 
watch list.”  This was changed to a recitation of the standard for inclusion in 
the TSDB: “The applicant is known or suspected of being or having been en-
gaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to ter-
rorism”; Compare Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 59932, 59939 
(Nov. 19, 2009) (proposed 8 C.F.R. § 235.7a(c)(2)(vii)) with Final Rule, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 5681, 5690 (Feb. 6, 2012) (adding  8 C.F.R. § 235.12(b)(2)(vi)).  The change 
occurred without any reference or comment, under the heading “Changes 
from the NPRM.”  Id. at 5687.   Customs and Border Patrol estimate the num-
ber of annual respondents to this program to be 1,414,434 persons.  See 83 Fed. 
Reg. 32674, 32675 (July 13, 2018). 
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Healy, then the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center and the lead offi-
cial responsible for its establishment in 2003: 
It is thus a non sequitur, at best, for appellants to rest on the fact that 
the TSDB “neither contains any classified information nor includes the derog-
atory information.”  Appellants’ Br. at 4.  Like a card catalog to a vast library, 
the TSDB is the entry point for all who seek those details.  Card catalogs are 
not supposed to contain the substance of the works they tag; their purpose is 
to show the way to those who would use those sources.  As appellants note in 
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the very next paragraph, this is precisely what happens: “TSC exports various 
subsets of the TSDB to different federal agencies, which use that information 
for various screening and other security functions.”  Id.  This sorting and ex-
port function is based on derogatory and often classified information to which 
the TSDB is linked.   
A shared card catalog was a sensible response to the 9/11 Commission’s 
finding that intelligence agencies jealously hoarded information and fought 
endless turf battles about access to it, contributing to the intelligence failure 
on September 11, 2001.  9/11 Commission Report at 417; Kahn (2017) at 76.  
But when the Government uses its vast repositories not to inform an intra-
government information network, but to execute its own extra-judicial deci-
sions to limit the liberty of suspect citizens, its card catalog is no longer merely 
a useful information source.20  It is an unadjudicated blacklist.21
20 Appellants’ assertion that “[t]he Government does not publicly disclose 
plaintiffs’ TSDB status,” Appellants’ Br. at 19, is undercut by its admission 
that “[t]he Government provides access to some TSDB data to private entities 
… But in those instances disclosure are [sic] not made broadly to the public 
….”  Appellants’ Br. at 44.   
21 Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 Wisc. L. Rev. 
1203, 1206 (2010) (“Persons appearing on a blacklist are not treated as sus-
pected wrongdoers, but as confirmed wrongdoers who face consequences as a 
result.”). 
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B. Appellants’ Assurance of Rigorous Procedures and Standards 
Are Pie-Crust Promises: Easily Made and Easily Broken 
Because no statute or regulations constrain the use of the TSDB, the 
watchlisters feel free to establish procedures and standards as they wish—and 
to disregard them when such self-constraint is no longer preferred.  Appel-
lants assert that TSDB nominations are subject to multiple levels of review. 
Appellants’ Br. at 3, 8-9.  But appellants are silent as to whether such review 
is required by statute or regulation because it is not subject to any such en-
forceable legal authority.  Appellants are similarly coy regarding the source 
for the standard they use to add someone to the TSDB.  Id. at 3.  The result is 
a very low hurdle for nominations to pass and, when even that low bar proves 
to be an undesired barrier, unfettered freedom to exempt nominations alto-
gether.   
This has always been the case.  In its first review of the TSC, the Justice 
Department’s Inspector General determined that “the TSC process for includ-
ing a name in the TSDB was more of an acceptance than nomination.  TSC 
staff did not review the majority of the records submitted unless an automated 
error occurred while the records were uploaded to the database.”  U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Terrorist 
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Screening Center 42 (2005).  The first TSC Director, Donna Bucella, candidly 
explained that: 
[T]o err on the side of caution, individuals with any degree of a 
terrorism nexus were included on the consolidated watch list, as 
long as minimum criteria was met (i.e., the person’s name was par-
tially known plus one other piece of identifying information, such 
as the date of birth).  The Director further explained that one of 
the benefits of watch listing individuals who pose a lower threat 
was that their movement could be monitored through the screen-
ing process and thereby provide useful intelligence information to 
counterterrorism investigators. 
Id. at viii-ix.  Even two years later, a follow-up inspection by the Inspector 
General’s Office found that “[d]espite being responsible for removing outdated 
or obsolete data from the TSDB, however, the TSC did not have a process for 
regularly reviewing the contents of the TSDB to ensure that the database does 
not include records that do not belong on the watchlists.”  U.S. Department of 
Justice, Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center 18 (2007). 
Facing both OIG audits and growing litigation pressure, multi-agency 
working groups and other bodies developed what became known as “watch-
listing guidance” for evaluating nominations.22  But the “reasonable suspicion” 
22 The March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance is an unclassified but “for official use 
only/sensitive security information” document that was published in 2014 by 
The Intercept, a blog operated by the investigative journalist Glenn Green-
wald.  Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret Government 
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standard that emerged is no real constraint.  The standard was inspired by 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which established this test for brief, warrant-
less stop-and-frisk detentions.  But contrary to Terry’s essential separation-
of-powers holding, these groups never intended that a neutral magistrate 
should ever evaluate how the watchlisters transplanted this test to watchlist-
ing decisions.  Kahn (2013), at 170 (citing the author’s interview with General 
Counsel to the Terrorist Screening Center); Jeffrey Kahn, The Unreasonable 
Rise of Reasonable Suspicion: Terrorist Watchlists and Terry v. Ohio, 26 Wm. 
& Mary Bill Rts J. 383, 386-87, 395-97 (2017).   
Appellants confirm that, with only minor (yet expansive) variation in the 
definitions used, a person may be placed in the TSDB upon a finding that there 
is a “reasonable suspicion” that he or she is a “suspected terrorist,” viz. “rea-
Rulebook for Labeling You a Terrorist, The Intercept, July 23, 2014, available 
at https://theintercept.com/2014/07/23/blacklisted/.  Appellants acknowledge 
the existence of a 2013 version of the Guidance, as well as a newer 2015 version, 
and that “[w]hile the 2015 Watchlisting Guidance includes information not con-
tained in previous versions, much of the information in previous versions re-
mains accurate and would provide similar (although somewhat less complete) 
insight into the details of the watchlisting enterprise.”  Decl. of Timothy P. 
Groh Submitted In Camera, Ex Parte in Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Motion 
to Compel, Elhady v. Kable, 1:16-cv-00375, Docket # 308-19 (E.D. Va. Mar. 
12, 2019), at ¶ 23.   
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sonably suspected to be, or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in prep-
aration for, in aid of, or related to Terrorism and or Terrorist Activities.”  Com-
pare March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance at § 1.24 & App. 1(W) with Appel-
lants’ Br. at 3.  Terrorist Activities are defined to include non-violent, facilita-
tive or supporting activities “such as providing a safe house, transportation, 
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material benefit ….”  March 
2013 Watchlisting Guidance at § 1.15.  The conclusion that these are invidious, 
rather than harmless or unknowing, actions is based on only a “reasonable 
suspicion” that such information is correct.  Id. at § 1.24.2 & App. 1(U).   
In Judge Trenga’s words, “an American citizen can find himself labeled 
a suspected terrorist because of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ based on a ‘reasonable 
suspicion.’”  Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F.Supp.2d 520, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2014).  
Although appellants assert that “[t]he nomination must rely upon artic-
ulable intelligence or information which … creates a reasonable suspicion,” 
Appellants’ Br. at 3 (emphasis added), this is not true.  For example, “[l]imited 
exceptions to the reasonable suspicion standard exist for the sole purpose of 
supporting certain special screening functions of DHS and State (such as de-
termining eligibility for immigration to the U.S.).”  Decl. of Timothy P. Groh, 
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Elhady v. Kable, 1:16-cv-375, Docket # 299-4, at 7-8, n.7.  Likewise, a nomina-
tor may use an “expedited” procedure for individual nominations in “exigent 
circumstances” (an undefined term) by calling a toll-free telephone number 
after normal duty hours to “telephonically complete a Terrorist Screening 
Center Expedited Nomination Request Form” and follow up within 72 hours 
with documentation providing the basis for watchlisting.  See March 2013 
Watchlisting Guidance at §§ 1.58.3-1.58.4.   
In fact, select officials can order a “temporary, threat-based expedited 
upgrade” that results in entire “categories of individuals to be temporarily up-
graded in watchlist status.”  Id. at § 1.59.  No “reasonable suspicion” standard 
is applied.  The initial direction need not even be in writing and may be re-
newed and extended for thirty-day periods.  Id. at §§ 1.59.2-1.59.3.  There is 
no exception to this exception for U.S. persons, although they are granted an 
“expedited procedure … to ensure their watchlisting status is appropriate (in-
cluding whether continued categorical watchlisting may be warranted based 
on the nature of the threat).”  Id. at § 1.59.6.  There is even an exception for 
individuals identified as terrorists under agreements with foreign govern-
ments, in which case a committee will decide, “country by country, prior to the 
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final agreement” whether that data will “be presumed to meet the standard 
for inclusion in TSDB” or undergo additional vetting.  Id. at § 3.13.3.  
Unsurprisingly given this laissez-faire approach, most nominations are 
successful.  Thus, for example, nominations to the TSDB more than doubled 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, while the percentage of rejected nomina-
tions rose from slightly more than 0.2 percent in 2009 (508 rejections out of 
227,932 nominations) to only slightly more than one percent in 2013 (4915 out 
of 468,749).  Defendants’ Objections and Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, Mohamed v. Holder, 1:11-cv-00050-AJT-TRJ (E.D. Va. 
March 28, 2014) (Docket No. 91-3).   
The March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance absolves the official who applies 
the reasonable suspicion standard of any responsibility to verify the infor-
mation he or she uses to add a person to the TSDB: 
Nominating Agencies should implement processes designed to en-
sure that nominations are free from errors, that recalled or re-
vised information is reviewed regularly, and that necessary cor-
rections to nominations based on those revisions/retractions are 
made.  Nominating Agencies should, to the extent possible given 
the nature of the reporting, verify the accuracy and reliability of 
the information included in nominations. 
March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance at § 1.24.2.  If an FBI agent submits a 
nomination form to the TSC to request that an individual be placed on the 
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TSDB, the information on the form is assessed as is.  This abdication renders 
rather empty the “biannual review of all U.S. persons in the TSDB to ensure 
that the underlying information supports the nomination.”  Appellants’ Br. at 
3.  The information is presumed accurate as submitted.  
The only No Fly List case to receive a trial in federal court, Ibrahim v. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 3:06-cv-0545 (WHA), provides concrete evi-
dence of how poorly this pass-the-buck approach to accuracy works in prac-
tice.23  Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim was a graduate student at Stanford University 
when she was unexpectedly approached by FBI Special Agent Kevin Michael 
Kelley.  The Government conceded at trial that Dr. Ibrahim did not at that 
time, nor at any other time, present any threat of domestic terrorism or any 
other threat to civil aviation security or national security.  Ibrahim v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Security, 62 F.Supp.3d 909, 915-17 (N.D. Cal. 2014).   
A month prior to meeting her, in November 2004, Agent Kelley nomi-
nated Dr. Ibrahim to several terrorist watchlists, including the TSDB.  He did 
this through a written form.  Agent Kelly admitted at trial that he misunder-
stood the instructions on the form and nominated Dr. Ibrahim to the wrong 
23 Prof. Kahn testified as an expert witness on these topics on behalf of the 
plaintiff in Ibrahim.
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lists, nominating her to the No Fly List and other watchlists completely by 
mistake.  According to the district court, Agent Kelley “checked the wrong 
boxes, filling out the form exactly the opposite way from the instructions on 
the form.”  The district court found this to be the “bureaucratic analogy to a 
surgeon amputating the wrong digit.”  Ibrahim, 62 F.Supp.3d at 928.   
As a result, when Dr. Ibrahim attempted to fly to an academic confer-
ence from San Francisco International Airport, she was handcuffed and 
lodged in a holding cell (though in need of wheelchair assistance) and humili-
ated in front of her fourteen-year-old daughter.  Ibrahim, 62 F.Supp.3d at 917.  
Her student visa was then revoked and she was forbidden to return to the 
United States.  Id.  Given that “suspicious adverse effects continued to haunt 
Dr. Ibrahim” long after the Government claimed to correct this error, the dis-
trict court found that “there is reason to doubt that the error and all of its 
echoes have been traced and cleansed from all interlocking databases.”  Id. at 
929.24   Agent Kelley’s single botched TSDB submission caromed “extensively 
through the government’s interlocking complex of databases, like a bad credit 
24 As one example of these “on-the-list-off-the-list machinations,” Dr. Ibra-
him’s daughter “was not allowed to fly to the United States even to attend this 
trial [almost nine years later] despite the fact that her daughter is a United 
States citizen.”  Id. 
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report that will never go away.”  Id. at 928. Agent Kelley would not realize his 
mistake for eight years—so much for oversight, biannually or otherwise.  The 
error was not caught when Agent Kelley filled out the form, when TSC officials 
mechanically entered his information, or when TSA and other agency officials 
acted on it.  One can only wonder what vetting process could confirm Dr. Ib-
rahim on multiple watchlists when not only was she negligently added to the 
list in the first place, but also when (as the court found and the Government 
conceded) Dr. Ibrahim was at no time a threat of any kind.  Neither routine 
nor ad hoc oversight procedures caught the error.  Only at Agent Kelley’s Sep-
tember 2013 deposition, permitted to proceed only after vigorous objections 
by government counsel, did Agent Kelley realize his monumental blunder.  See
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 912 F.3d 1147, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(en banc).   
The nature of the form Agent Kelley bungled is indicative of the nature 
of the watchlisting enterprise itself.  A blank copy of this form appears below.25
25 Both the District Court, Ibrahim, 62 F.Supp.3d at 916, and the Court of Ap-
peals, Ibrahim, 912 F.3d at 1158, were sufficiently struck by the nature of this 
form as to reproduce copies of Agent Kelley’s erroneously completed version 
of it.  The Court of Appeals also reproduced a blank copy, id. at 1157, the 
source for this image. 
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The form presented a list of watchlists with the presumption that a nom-
ination would be made to all of them.  The form instructed the FBI agent to 
positively opt out of those watchlists to which the FBI agent did not recom-
mend the subject be added.  An opt-out construction is entirely expected, given 
the culture that prevailed at the Terrorist Screening Center, the FBI unit re-
sponsible for watchlisting.   
II. The Terrorist Screening Center 
“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of 
facts decisive of rights.”  Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 
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U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).  Unfor-
tunately, that is precisely the environment in which the work of the TSC is 
done.  
A. The TSC Insulates Itself from Ordinary Sources of Oversight 
and Accountability, Creating an Institutional Culture in 
Need of Judicial Review 
Like the TSDB that it compiles, the TSC was created by executive di-
rective, not statute, “to consolidate the Government’s approach to terrorism 
screening[.]”  HSPD-6 at ¶ 1; HSPD-11 at ¶ 2 (the TSC “was established and 
is administered by the Attorney General pursuant to HSPD-6”).  Neither the 
TSC nor the FBI, within which the TSC is administered, promulgates regula-
tions that would subject its organizational and operational choices to notice-
and-comment rulemaking.  To the contrary, what regulations exist exempt the 
TSC from various provisions of the Privacy Act.  See, e.g.,  28 C.F.R. 
§16.96(s)(4) & (6)-(8) (FBI) and 6 C.F.R. Pt. 5, App. C (DHS).  In place of any 
statutory requirements, the FBI provides unenforceable assurances that the 
TSC’s self-regulation will suffice.  See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §16.96(s)(7) (exempting 
the TSC from the Privacy Act requirement to maintain records “with such ac-
curacy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to 
assure fairness to the individual in the determination,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), 
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because, inter alia, “[t]he restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability 
of those agencies’ trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise 
their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of 
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism ef-
forts.  The TSC has, however, implemented internal quality assurance proce-
dures to ensure that TSC terrorist screening data is as thorough, accurate, 
and current as possible.” (emphases added)).       
The Terrorist Screening Center does not accept redress inquiries di-
rectly from the public.26  The FBI has not disclosed the physical location of the 
TSC, which was only revealed by accident to be in Vienna, Virginia.  Tom Jack-
man, Vienna Tormented by FBI Building’s Non-Stop Buzz, Wash. Post, June 
21, 2012.  Although the building lacks any visible signs, newspaper accounts 
can now be confirmed using Google Maps because the Center’s former director 
dramatically revealed during an interview on CNN that its employee entrance 
is ornamented with a three-story tall sculpture taken from the rubble of the 
World Trade Center’s North Tower.  Exclusive Interview with Terrorist 
26 https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-
branch/tsc. 
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Screening Center Director Christopher Piehota, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016).27  The 
interview began by highlighting the sculpture:  
As this image from Google Maps better illustrates, the sculpture is placed so 
that employees must file past it each morning on their way from the secure 
parking lot to the building entrance. 
27 http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/04/06/exclusive-interview-with-ter-
rorist-screening-center-director-christopher-piehota-origwx-allee.cnn. 
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This sobering opportunity for reflection at the start of the work day is hardly 
accidental.  In his interview, TSC Director Christopher Piehota explained the 
purpose of this sculpture to his CNN interviewer: “It reminds us daily of the 
importance of what we do.”  Id. at 00:20-00:41.       
Nor is the sculpture the only reminder.  Once inside the building, these 
reminders continue.  CBS News reported that “[t]hroughout the Terrorist 
Screening Center are placed artifacts from various terrorist attacks including 
Oklahoma City federal building, the USS Cole bombing, and the World Trade 
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Centers.  All sober reminders of how important their work is.”  Bob Orr, In-
side a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS Evening News, Oct. 1, 
2012, 9:03 PM.28
Four years later, in his 2016 interview, Director Piehota escorted his 
CNN interviewer through this macabre museum and showed CNN’s audience 
the images his staff see each morning.  Again, his message was very clear.  As 
he somberly observed standing in front of another piece of the wreckage from 
the World Trade Center, “the remnants were put here to remind our staff of 
our mission, which is to prevent acts of terrorism.  Keeps us mindful of the 
threat that is still out there.  Each remnant or each artifact shows you the 
evolution of terrorism.”  Id. at 00:20-00:41.     
28 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/inside-a-secret-us-terrorist-screening-center/.
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Since this building is not accessible to the public, this museum’s purpose 
is not to educate anyone who does not work at the TSC.  Tellingly, none of the 
exhibits shown in this interview concerned the successful use of the TSDB or 
other terrorist watchlists to prevent acts of terrorism.  Some exhibits predated 
the existence of the TSC.29  Others, like the “Underwear Bomber” on North-
west Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009, actually demonstrate the fail-
ure of the TSC to use its watchlisting tools effectively.   
29 In addition to these exhibits, the FBI has posted a time-lapse video that 
shows individuals (who must be TSC employees, given the guarded nature of 
the facility) praying as shadows, cast by three flagpoles that once stood in front 
of the World Trade Center, pass over a 9/11 memorial at a security gate to the 
USCA4 Appeal: 20-1119      Doc: 43-1            Filed: 06/02/2020      Pg: 36 of 44
28 
The message to the employees passing these artifacts of intelligence fail-
ures seems clear: Do not err on the side of caution; do not interrogate too rig-
orously the judgments of those who send you names of people to be watch-
listed.  There will be no reward (and there is too much at risk) to question the 
reasons for adding someone who has been placed on the watchlist.  The rea-
sonable suspicion standard is meant to accord deference to the reasonable sus-
picion of FBI agents, not to provide an independent, neutral adjudication of 
their claims. 
B. Legal Precedents That Accord Discretion to Predict Future 
Conduct Rely on Transparency and Neutrality That the TSC 
Eschews in Favor of Unconstitutionally Vague Standards 
Riddled with Exceptions  
Appellants rely on a single case that rejected a vagueness challenge to 
the (for now) four published criteria used to compose the No Fly List.  They 
seek the same result for their “reasonable suspicion” standard as applied to 
“the underlying reasons or intelligence on which a person’s TSDB status may 
TSC building.  These shadows cross the memorial once each year at the pre-
cise times the four hijacked planes crashed.  See FBI TSC video, available at 
https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/160906-terrorist-screening-center-
sept11-memorial.mp4/view.   There is no doubt that the mourners paying their 
respects are sincere.  The sculpture and artifacts are vivid reminders of 
threats to our national security. But these monuments to vigilance in no way 
create the presence of mind needed for dispassionate adjudication of evidence.   
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be based,” although appellants decline to disclose what they are.  Appellants’ 
Br. at 53, 11 (citing Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 365-66, 369-77 (9th Cir. 
2019)).   
The Kashem plaintiffs’ argument was that the criteria were vague “be-
cause they are based on a threat assessment involving a prediction of future 
criminal conduct.”  Kashem, 941 F.3d at 371.  Rejecting this position, the court 
principally relied on Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (finding that a juve-
nile’s pretrial detention based on “an experienced prediction” by a Family 
Court judge of future criminal conduct is not unconstitutionally vague); Jurek 
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (describing judges’ prediction-driven roles 
in bail and sentencing decisions; parole boards in parole decisions; and juries 
in capital sentencing decisions); and Johnson v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 135 
S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (noting in dicta and as “a general matter” the consti-
tutionality of laws that require a judge or jury to gauge “the riskiness of con-
duct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion.”) (em-
phasis in original). 
Such courtroom or administrative board activities employ not just spe-
cial expertise but a predilection for transparency and adversarial proceedings. 
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 279 (“Given the right to a hearing, to counsel, and 
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to a statement of reasons, there is no reason that the specific factors upon 
which the Family Court judge might rely must be specified in the statute.”).  
The judges, jurors, and parole board members charged with making these de-
cisions do so in open forums where their work is observed, assessed, critiqued 
and sometimes overturned by others in a judicial hierarchy.  What could look 
less like the operation of the secretive TSC than such open and rules-based 
proceedings?  And, compared to the artifacts of terrorism that anonymous 
TSC analysts pass on their way into a secure facility, the judges and quasi-
judicial figures in these cases may pass the ubiquitous statues of blindfolded 
Lady Justice that dot courthouses throughout the country.  All institutions use 
physical cues to sculpt the attitude desired for those that enter their buildings, 
for good reason. 
A vagueness analysis is an “objective inquiry” into “whether the law 
gives ‘a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,’” Ka-
shem, 941 F.3d at 371 (citing U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  In 
Williams, Justice Scalia observed: “What renders a statute vague is not the 
possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incrim-
inating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of 
precisely what that fact is … [Unconstitutionally vague statutes require] 
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wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, 
or settled legal meanings.”  Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected a vagueness challenge to the four No Fly List 
criteria, which rely on application of the reasonable suspicion standard to stat-
utory definitions of domestic and international terrorism.  Kashem, 941 F.3d 
at 365-66.  Arguably, there is no indeterminacy there “of precisely what that 
fact is.”  The criteria rely on statutes that define with particularity the multiple 
elements of international and domestic terrorism.  18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) & (5). 
Indeed, the criteria are sometimes further limited to such threats when ap-
plied to aircraft or government facilities.  
But there is abundant indeterminacy regarding precisely what facts ren-
der someone suspicious enough for inclusion in the TSDB.  What is “conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, in aid or in furtherance of, or related to, ter-
rorism and/or terrorist activities”?  Appellants’ Br. at 3.  The March 2013 
Watchlisting Guidance states that “terrorism and/or terrorist activities” “com-
bine elements from various federal definitions” but identifies none in particu-
lar.  March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance at App. 1(Y).  What might “aid … 
further[], or relate[] to” those unspecified statutory definitions?  The Guidance 
unhelpfully posits that “to be reasonable, suspicion should be as clear and as 
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fully developed as circumstances permit.”  Id. at § 3.5.  Sometimes, the Guid-
ance seems to broaden in ill-defined ways appellants’ formulaic “conduct con-
stituting” criteria.  For example, the Guidance supports a reasonable suspicion 
of individuals who are “sympathizers and supporters” of a designated terrorist 
organization when support is “operational in nature” and not “merely ideolog-
ical.”  Id. at § 3.13.8.1.  Similarly, an inference of reasonable suspicion may 
arise because of the “frequency, duration, or manner” of contact and other un-
specified “malevolent or illicit factors that can be articulated that would sup-
port” a reasonable suspicion.  Id. at § 3.13.4.1.2 & 3.13.4.1.4.   
In any event, the numerous exceptions to applying the reasonable sus-
picion standard mean that inclusion on the TSDB may depend on none of the 
twists and turns expanding the vague contours of “reasonable suspicion” at all.   
See supra Part I.B.  “Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he 
said, ‘The more you explain it, the more I don’t understand it.’”  SEC v. 
Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment below. 
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